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ARTICLE
HANDLING CLAIMS IN PONZI SCHEME
BANKRUPTCY AND RECEIVERSHIP CASES *
KATHY BAZOIAN PHELPS * *

INTRODUCTION
The end game for defrauded investors and other creditors in a Ponzi
scheme case is the recovery of the maximum amount on their claims.
Depending on whether the Ponzi perpetrator has landed in a bankruptcy
case or a receivership proceeding, the rules governing the allowance and
distribution priorities for claims filed in Ponzi scheme cases may vary.
This Article discusses the treatment of the defrauded investor’s claim in
both bankruptcy and receivership cases. This Article also contrasts
relatively rigid provisions in the Bankruptcy Code for the allowance,
priority and distribution of claims in Ponzi scheme cases with the more
flexible approaches that district courts in receivership proceedings have
adopted. Finally, this Article discusses particular provisions under the
Bankruptcy Code that may apply to other aspects of claims allowance,
priority and distribution in a Ponzi scheme case.

In bankruptcy cases, Ponzi schemes bring unique issues to the
claims allowance and distribution processes. Some of these issues can be
*
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March 2012), and is published here in this form with permission. For more information, go to:
www.ThePonziBook.com.
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accommodated by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, while others
are not addressed under the established statutory authority. Ponzi cases
involve a variety of types of creditors rather than a pool of similarly
situated general unsecured creditors, as in many other cases. For
example, the defrauded investors in a Ponzi case may or may not be
similarly situated. Some of those investors may assert claims for the
recovery of their unpaid principal, others for their unpaid but expected
profits, and yet others for both unpaid principal and profits, all depending
on how much money they have been repaid throughout the Ponzi
scheme. Meanwhile, trade creditors such as utilities or landlords seek
payment for the services and goods they provided to enable the business
to continue. Other creditors may assert breach of contract claims for the
failure of the Ponzi perpetrator to provide promised funding because the
Ponzi scheme collapsed. In equity, each of these different types of
claims may call for unique treatment, but the Bankruptcy Code does not
permit a trustee to consider them as distinct classes of creditors.
District courts presiding over receivership proceedings, on the other
hand, are granted equitable powers to fashion relief on a case-by-case
basis, unconstrained by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The
decisions resulting from Ponzi receivership cases reflect a variety of
methodologies for establishing the priority of claims.
These
methodologies may differentiate between the principal and interest
portions of the defrauded investors’ claims, and may provide for
differing treatment of prior distributions made to investors during the
course of a Ponzi scheme.
The challenge for both a trustee and a receiver in distributing funds
in Ponzi cases is to address and manage these varied interests within the
confines of the Bankruptcy Code and the established methodologies used
in Ponzi cases, while striving to distribute equitably the available cash,
most if not all of which is likely derived from the defrauded investors’
contributions into the fraudulent scheme.
I.

TREATMENT OF THE DEFRAUDED INVESTOR’S CLAIM

The principal challenges in administering defrauded investors’
claims in a Ponzi case are: (1) how to determine the allowable amount of
the claim, taking into consideration the distinction between the unpaid
principal portion of the claim and the unpaid expected profits portion of
the claim; and (2) how to treat payments previously made to the claimant
during the course of the Ponzi scheme.
A defrauded investor in a Ponzi scheme will likely assert a claim for
all amounts invested and not repaid plus the amount of unpaid fictitious
profits that were promised or that may be reflected in a statement of
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account. A trustee or receiver, seeking both to maximize the returns to
all creditors and to equalize the distributions to all investors, will likely
seek to disallow promised fictitious profits and to reduce the investor’s
claim by setting off the claim amount by the total amount distributed to
the claimant during the course of the Ponzi scheme. For example, an
investor who has invested $100,000 for one year with a promised return
of 10% per month and who has been repaid $50,000 over a five month
period might assert a claim for the principal invested of $100,000 plus
the unpaid promised returns for the 7 remaining months of $70,000, for a
total of $170,000. A trustee or receiver, on the other hand, will likely
assert that the $50,000 paid to the investor during the Ponzi scheme was
a return of principal, and that the only amount owing is the balance of the
unreturned principal, or $50,000. The differentiation between principal
amounts invested and expected fictitious profits, therefore, becomes
critical in Ponzi schemes in the claims allowance and distribution
process.
A.

THE INVESTOR CLAIM UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Under the Bankruptcy Code, there is a question whether trustees
have any leeway in distinguishing between a claim for unreturned
principal and a claim for expected fictitious profits. The Bankruptcy
Code has no separate priority or allowance provisions that expressly
permit such a distinction, as discussed in section II of this Article.
Nevertheless, relying on principles of equity, some bankruptcy courts
have permitted a trustee to make such a distinction, to bifurcate claims,
and to disallow or subordinate the expected profits portion of the
investor’s claim. The court in In re Taubman, for example, held:
Based upon the express equitable powers entrusted to the bankruptcy
court, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 502(b)(1), 502(j), and 510(c)(1), and,
based upon the foregoing applicable case law, the court concludes that
equity dictates that the proofs of claim be split into an “A” portion and
a “B” portion. The “A” claim represents on a cash-in/cash-out basis
the difference, if any, between what an investor actually invested, lent,
or gave to the Debtor, minus the total he or she received back at any
time. The “B” portion consists of all profit, interest, return of
principal, punitive damages, multiple damages, or any amount in
excess of actual pecuniary loss. The “B” claims shall receive
1
distribution only after all “A” claims have been paid in full.

1

In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
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Other courts have similarly held that it is not equitable to include
fictitious profits in the claim amount. For example, the court in Official
Cattle Contract Holders Committee v. Commons (In re Tedlock Cattle
Co.) held that the trustee could use an “equitable” theory to exclude
profits in claim calculation rather than use a “benefit-of-the-bargain”
theory. 2
Additionally, the court in Abrams v. Eby (In re Young) held that a
claimant could not share in the remaining funds until he had accounted
for his profits and that allowing a claim for both false profits and the
original investment would not be equitable because the profits had been
paid at the expense of the other equally innocent investors in the fund. 3
The court noted:
We have, then, a common enterprise, a common fund, contributed by
all the customers, a manager common to all, his breach of trust
common to all, losses common to all. It follows that all sums paid as
profits to one adventurer from the common fund, when there was no
profit, was an unjust enrichment of that adventurer from the fund
belonging to all in common, sufficient to pay but a small dividend on
the capital sums actually paid in. Equity therefore requires that he
should account for all sums paid to him as profit before he can share
with others in the application of the funds on hand to the debts due for
4
sums actually paid in.

The court in Lustig v. Weisz & Associates, Inc. (In re Unified
Commercial Capital), in analyzing Bankruptcy Code section 548 and
whether reasonably equivalent value is exchanged for the return of
principal, first noted that, “The simple fact is that the use of funds for a
period of time has value.” 5 In other words, the court observed that it
could be appropriate to recognize the time value of the use of funds.
Nevertheless, the court then went on to discuss why the allowance of a
claim for fictitious profits may not be appropriate in a Ponzi scheme
case:
In the context of false profits, there may be some logic to such a
distinction between transfers of principal and of amounts in excess of
principal. If a person invests money with the understanding that he
will share in the profits produced by his investment, and it turns out
2

Official Cattle Contract Holders Comm. v. Commons (In re Tedlock Cattle Co., Inc.), 552
F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1997).
3
Abrams v. Eby (In re Young), 294 F. 1 (4th Cir. 1923).
4
Id. at 4.
5
Lustig v. Weisz & Assocs., Inc. (In re Unified Commercial Capital), Nos. 01–MBK–
6004L, 01–MBK–6005L, 2002 WL 32500567, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).
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that there are no profits, it is difficult to see how that person can make
a claim to receive any more than the return of his principal investment.
The false representation by the Ponzi schemer that he is paying the
investor his share of the profits, which are in fact nothing more than
funds invested by other victims, cannot alter the fact that there are no
profits to share. 6

The Unified Commercial Capital court reconciled its two
viewpoints that: (1) interest should compensate for the use of money, but
that (2) false profits should not be paid in a Ponzi scheme, by finding
that, under the facts of the case before the court, “the payments to
Associates were not simply payments of nonexistent profits, but of a
contractually provided-for, commercially reasonable rate of interest on
what amounted to a loan by Associates to Unified.” 7
Thus, depending on the facts of a case and the court’s view of the
legitimacy of the payment of interest or profits in a Ponzi case, a trustee
may be permitted to bifurcate an investor’s claim in the claim allowance
and distribution process in a bankruptcy case, and pay actual pecuniary
loss before expected profits, punitive damages, or other amounts in
excess of the actual pecuniary loss. Such bifurcation is not expressly
provided for under the Bankruptcy Code, however, and is up to the
discretion of the bankruptcy court.
In addition to determining whether unpaid fictitious profits should
be allowed as part of a defrauded investor’s claim, a court must
determine how to account for payments that were made to the investor
during the course of the Ponzi scheme. In this regard, the Bankruptcy
Code provides some limited guidance and leeway for a trustee to seek
disallowance of claims. Section 502(d), discussed more fully in Section
II of this Article, provides that an investor’s claim may be disallowed
unless and until a voidable transfer is returned to the estate. 8 Thus, if an
investor does not return an avoided transfer, then any remaining claim by
the investor will be disallowed. If, however, the investor does return the
avoided transfer, then the claimant may file a claim or amend a
previously filed claim to include the amounts disgorged to the trustee.

6

Id.
Id. The court supported this finding by noting that the debtor “represented that it was
selling ‘debentures’ and ‘certificates of deposit’ to investors with ‘guaranteed’ returns of twelve
percent or more annually.” Id. On typical Ponzi facts, the court was unwilling to apply an across the
board rule and policy judgment that in Ponzi cases there is not necessarily no value given in
exchange for the use of money. The court concluded that this was a “legal fiction” and a policy
decision “that should be made by Congress.” Id. at *5-6.
8
11 U.S.C.A. § 502(d) (Westlaw 2012).
7
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Nevertheless, as otherwise discussed in this Article, a claim for fictitious
profits or interest may not ultimately be allowed in the case.
B.

THE INVESTOR CLAIM IN RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS

In receivership proceedings, the district court sits in equity and has
“the authority to approve any plan provided it is ‘fair and reasonable.’” 9
A receiver’s distribution plan may, therefore, distinguish between
different types of claimants and provide for different treatment for
different classes of investors. 10 For example, a distribution plan may
seek to limit distributions to those claimants who suffered actual out-ofpocket losses. 11 Or, differing treatment may be sought for distributions
to investors in contrast to trade creditors. 12 In CFTC v. Capitalstreet
Financial, LLC, the court approved a higher priority for defrauded
investors as compared to non-investor general creditors, without
explanation of its decision, as follows:
The Receivership Estate shall be distributed in the following order:
A. To claims for expenses of the administration of the Receivership
Estate, including legal and accounting fees; expenses to preserve the
value of assets; and costs of realization and payment of any taxes due
on property or income of property of the Receivership Estate incurred
during the pendency of the receivership (the “Administrative
Claimants”);
B. To the return of investments to Investors; and
C. To any General Creditors, should any assets remain in the
13
Receivership Estate.

There is very limited statutory authority governing claims allowance
and distribution in regulatory receivership cases. Courts presiding over
receivership and SIPA 14 proceedings have developed a range of
9

S.E.C. v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting S.E.C. v. Wang,
944 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir. 1991)).
10
S.E.C. v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1991).
11
S.E.C. v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, 817 F.2d 1018, 1021 (2d Cir. 1987).
12
See, e.g., Nw. Bank Wisc., N.A. v. Malachi Corp., 245 Fed. App’x 488, 495 (6th Cir.
2007).
13
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Capitalstreet Fin., LLC, No. 3:09cv387–
RJC–DCK, 2010 WL 2572349, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 18, 2010); see also S.E.C. v. HKW Trading
LLC, No. 8:05–cv–1076–T–24–TBM, 2009 WL 2499146 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2009).
14
In 1970, Congress created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a
nonprofit corporation to which most registered broker-dealers are required to belong. See 15
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methodologies to account for withdrawals made by investors during a
Ponzi scheme. In contrast to a trustee in a bankruptcy case, a receiver
may craft and propose a distribution plan that classifies claims in a
manner specific to the facts of a particular case and based on equitable
considerations. 15
In receivership cases, courts adopting different methodologies
regarding claim allowance and distribution priorities have addressed the
competing needs of the differing categories of investors. These
competing interests are summarized as follows:
(1) Net winner investors who were paid profits on top of the return of
their principal investment: (a) seek to retain to profits already paid to
them; and (b) may file claims for all expected but unpaid profits as
reflected on their last account statement received from the Ponzi
debtor.
(2) Net loser investors who received something, but less than the full
amount of their principal: (a) seek to retain to distributions already
paid to them; and (b) may file claims for additional amounts of both
unpaid principal and expected profits.
(3) Net loser investors who received nothing: (a) find it unfair that
other investors can retain any prior distributions made to them; and (b)
want the receiver to seek disgorgement of all amounts paid to other
investors so that all investors can be treated on an equitable pro rata
basis.
(4) Receivers, faced with the task of maximizing the pot available for
distribution, must balance allowance and distribution issues with their
avoiding power rights to bring back into the estate prior distributions
made to some investors. They, therefore, seek to reduce investor
claims by the amounts of distributions previously made to the
investors and, under fraudulent transfer law or other legal theories,
may seek to recover interest and principal paid to investors.

U.S.C.A. § 78ccc (Westlaw 2012). “SIPC insures investors who deposit cash or securities with a
broker against the risk of broker insolvency.” SIPC v. Pepperdine Univ. (In re Brentwood Sec.,
Inc.), 925 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1991).
15
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Enter. Trust Co., 559 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2009); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. S.E.C., 467 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
district courts have broad authority to craft remedies for securities violations); S.E.C. v. Basic
Energy & Affiliated Res., Inc., 273 F.3d 657, 668 (6th Cir. 2001); S.E.C. v. Forex Asset Mgmt.
LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n shaping equity decrees the trial court is vested with
broad discretionary power.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); S.E.C. v. Hardy, 803
F.2d 1034, 1037-39 (9th Cir. 1986).
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In order to accommodate these competing interests, courts have
approved different methodologies for allowing and making distribution
on investor claims, which are summarized below.
1.

Last Statement Method

The Last Statement Method allows claims based upon the amounts
identified on the last statement generated on the customer’s account. 16
The Last Statement Method, although not widely adopted, is a favorite of
investors who have accumulated profits on their statements and who seek
to be paid those expected profits. In CFTC v. Richwell, the court
approved a plan that distributed remaining assets to existing investors
“pro rata on the basis of the lesser of (a) current account balance . . . and
(b) their total net deposits into their margin account.” 17 Customers who
had made profits would be entitled to their entire initial investment,
while those who had suffered losses would be limited to what remained
in their accounts. The Richwell court approved the receiver’s plan
because, within its broad discretion, it concluded that it was the most
equitable compromise, because the company had detailed accounting
records that made it straightforward to segregate customer accounts. 18
2.

Net Investment Method

Many courts have adopted the “cash in/cash out” or “net
investment” methodology in fixing the amount of investor claims. The
Net Investment Method credits the amount of cash deposited by the
customer into his or her account and deducts any amounts withdrawn
from it. 19
The Net Investment Method and the Last Statement Method are the
two competing methodologies used to calculate “net equity” in SIPA
proceedings for purposes of determining the customer’s claim amount
pursuant to SIPA section 78lll(11). 20 In the Madoff case, the court

16

Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Richwell Int’l, Ltd., 163 B.R. 161 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1994).
17
Id. at 162 (footnote omitted).
18
Id. at 163-64.
19
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011).
20
15 U.S.C.A. § 78lll(11) (Westlaw 2012); SIPA § 78lll (11) defines “net equity” as:
[T]he dollar amount of the account or accounts of a customer, to be determined by—
(A) calculating the sum which would have been owed by the debtor to such customer if
the debtor had liquidated, by sale or purchase on the filing date—
(i) all securities positions of such customer . . . ; minus
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approved the Net Investment Method to determine a customer’s net
equity. 21 That court summarized its rationale in affirming the Net
Investment Method over the Last Statement Method as follows:
The statutory definition of “net equity” does not require the Trustee to
aggravate the injuries caused by Madoff’s fraud. Use of the Last
Statement Method in this case would have the absurd effect of treating
fictitious and arbitrarily assigned paper profits as real and would give
legal effect to Madoff’s machinations. 22

3.

Modified Net Investment Methodology

Some courts have modified the Net Investment Method, referring to
it as the “Modified Net Investment Method.” 23 In CFTC v. Barki, LLC,
the court described the Modified Net Investment Method as follows,
“[T]he investors could retain their withdrawn ‘profits’ but would receive
a pro rata share based on the sum of their initial investments and the
‘illusory profits’ that were never withdrawn from the account minus the
profit distribution . . . .” 24
This methodology differs from the Net Investment Method,
whereby “the investors could retain their [withdrawn] ‘profits’ but would
receive a pro rata share based on their initial investments minus the
profit distribution, i.e., profits would be subtracted before determining
the investor’s pro rata shares.” 25 In other words, under the Net
Investment Method, if an investor had invested $100,000 with a
promised interest rate of ten percent per month and been repaid $50,000,
the claim would be allowed at the difference of the money in ($100,000)
and the money out ($50,000), for a total of $50,000. Under the Modified
Net Investment, the same investor’s claim would be allowed at the
amount of the difference of the initial investment plus expected profits
(i.e., $100,000 investment plus assumed one year expected profits of
$120,000 for a total of $220,000) less the money out ($50,000) for a total
of $170,000.

(B) any indebtedness of such customer to the debtor on the filing date . . . .
15 U.S.C.A. § 78lll(11).
21
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229.
22
Id. at 235.
23
See, e.g., U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Barki, LLC, No. 3:09 CV 106–
MU, 2009 WL 3839389, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2009); S.E.C. v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
24
Barki, LLC, 2009 WL 3839389, at *1.
25
Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6

576
4.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Rising Tide Method

The general concept of the Rising Tide Method is that all investors
should, in equity, receive an equal percentage distribution on their lost
investments, considering both the prior payments from the Ponzi
perpetrator and the distributions to be made from the estate. “Payments
received by the claimant prior to the Ponzi Scheme’s collapse are treated
as ‘distributions’ on par with the distributions to be made by the
Receiver, so that prior amounts paid by [the debtor] are credited against
the amount that would otherwise be paid from the Receiver Estate.” 26
As explained in CFTC v. Equity Financial Group, LLC, “Under this
method, investors are permitted to retain previously received funds, but
those withdrawals will be credited against the investors’ respective pro
rata shares calculated based on the full amounts invested.” 27
Several courts have attempted to describe the Rising Tide Method,
with varying degrees of usefulness. The Equity Financial court simply
explained that distributions under the Rising Tide Method are “calculated
according to the following formula: (actual dollars invested x pro rata
multiplier) - withdrawals previously received = distribution amount.” 28
In Parish, the court described the Rising Tide Method as follows:
In effect, an individual investor’s loss is deemed to be the gross
amount actually invested in the scheme. Payments received by the
investor prior to the scheme’s collapse are treated as “distributions” on
par with the distributions to be made by the Receiver, so that prior
amounts paid by Parish are credited against (i.e., subtracted from) the
amount that would otherwise be paid from the receivership estate.
Under this method, investors who received prior payments are entitled
to receive a smaller pro-rata payment from the receivership estate
than those who received no prior payment. Moreover, investors who
previously received payments exceeding their pro rata amount of the
total distribution will receive no distribution from the receivership
29
estate.

In In re Receiver, the court adopted the receiver’s proposed
formula:

26

In re Receiver, No. 3:10–3141–MBS, 2011 WL 2601849, at *2 (D.S.C. July 1, 2011).
Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Equity Fin. Grp., LLC, No. Civ.04-1512 RBK
AMD, 2005 WL 2143975, at *24 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2005).
28
Id.
29
S.E.C. v. Parish, No. 2:07–cv–00919–DCN, 2010 WL 5394736, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10,
2010).
27
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(Amount to Distribute) DIVIDED BY (Total Actual Deposits made by
all allowed Claimants) MULTIPLIED BY (the Actual Deposit
associated with each Claim) MINUS (Actual Return associated with
each Claim). 30

All of these methodologies for allowance and distributions can and
have been considered equitable, depending on the facts of the particular
case and the court’s evaluation of the distributions under the several
methodologies. 31 In Lake Shore, the court stated,
The propriety of using the “Net Investment” method, however,
does not turn on whether mathematically, a group of investors will
lose more under the “Rising Tide” method than other investors will
gain. Instead, as discussed above, the court must determine which
method is equitable given the facts and circumstances of this case. 32

C.

TREATMENT OF ROLLED OVER DISTRIBUTIONS

In both bankruptcy and receivership cases, one other area of debate
in calculating claims in Ponzi cases is whether to give credit to investors
for distributions that they rolled over from fictitious profits as a new
investment. 33 For example, where an investor has accumulated fictitious
profits on account of its investment in the Ponzi scheme, that investor
could either withdraw those “profits” or roll them over into the
investment account to be treated as additional principal invested. The
objection to the treatment of the profits as an additional principal
investment is that credit for such rollover is inequitable because the
profits that were rolled over were illusory and, in essence, not a real
investment. 34 On the other hand, the claimants contend that if had they
not rolled over the investment, they would have withdrawn those profits
and, “Ignoring the rolled-over amount, as the objectors propose, would
further penalize those investors who chose to roll over their investments
rather than receive them in cash. Such a result would be inequitable.” 35

30

In re Receiver, 2011 WL 2601849, at *3.
U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Barki, LLC, No. 3:09 CV 106–MU, 2009
WL 3839389 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2009).
32
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd., No. 07 C
3598, 2010 WL 960362, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2010).
33
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 2d 166, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (permitting a credit
for the amounts rolled over as new investments).
34
Id. at 182.
35
Id. at 183.
31
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In SEC v. Byers, the court approved a distribution plan that included
the rolled over distributions as an additional investment of principal:
The Plan also proposes that any distributions investors chose to roll
over into the funds—rather than receive in the form of cash—be added
to the baseline amount for calculating their distribution under the Plan.
In other words, the Plan would treat a rolled-over distribution as an
out-of-pocket loss. The following examples illustrate the proposal:
Investor A had a gross investment of $ 100,000. Rather than take a
cash distribution, he rolled over $ 20,000 back into his Wextrust
investment. His net investment amount would be $ 120,000. Assuming
a pro rata multiplier of 10%, Investor A’s distribution would be $
12,000.
Investor B had a gross investment of $ 100,000. Investor B took a cash
distribution of $ 20,000 at one point, and later rolled over $ 50,000.
Her net investment amount would be $ 130,000. Assuming a pro rata
36
multiplier of 10%, Investor B’s distribution would be $ 13,000.

II.

OTHER PRIORITY AND DISTRIBUTION ISSUES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE

Although the Bankruptcy Code does not contain any provisions that
specifically address Ponzi schemes or the allowance and priority of
investor claims that are incurred in connection with a Ponzi scheme, the
Bankruptcy Code has application to other aspects of claims allowance,
priority and distribution which might apply in a Ponzi scheme case.
A.

TEN CATEGORIES OF PRIORITY CLAIMS

Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code 37 sets forth an ordered scheme
containing ten categories of claims entitled to priority in a bankruptcy
case. 38 None of these ten categories relate specifically to claims in Ponzi
36

Id.
11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (Westlaw 2012).
38
The ten categories of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 507 are summarized as follows:
37

(a)(1): Domestic support obligations
(a)(2): Administrative expenses allowable under § 503(b)
(a)(3): Gap period claims allowed under § 502(f)
(a)(4): Claims for wages, salaries and commissions
(a)(5): Employee benefit plan contributions
(a)(6): Claims by grain producers and United States fishermen
(a)(7): Consumer deposits
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cases. The second of the priority claims set forth in section 507, for
administrative expenses under section 503, however, may be relevant in
a Ponzi case. 39 A little-used provision of section 503(b), subparagraph
(3)(C), may offer defrauded investors some relief, to the extent they
assisted in the criminal prosecution of the Ponzi perpetrator. The third
priority for administrative claims pursuant section 503(b)(3)(C) provides
for reimbursement of expenses incurred by a creditor in connection with
the prosecution of a criminal offense relating to the case or to the
business or property of the debtor. 40 Accordingly, a creditor active in the
assistance of the prosecution of a criminal case against the Ponzi
perpetrator may be entitled to administrative expense priority for its
costs. Under that section, a creditor is not required to show that the
expenses provided a benefit of the estate, but must show a direct
relationship between the expenses sought and the criminal prosecution. 41
The creditor must also prove that the prosecution of the criminal offense
relates to the debtor’s case, business or property. 42 This provision would
not, however, appear to elevate the creditor’s Ponzi scheme losses
themselves to priority status.
B.

CHANGING PRIORITIES 43

While sections 503 and 507 establish clear priorities for different
categories of claims, those priorities can be altered by other sections of
the Bankruptcy Code that may impact the manner in which interest is

(a)(8): Tax obligations and customs duties
(a)(9): Commitments to regulatory agencies
(a)(10): Drunk driving claims
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507(a)(1)-(10) (Westlaw 2012).
39
11 U.S.C.A. § 503 (Westlaw 2012).
40
Section 503(b)(3)(C) states that an administrative expense shall be allowed for “the actual,
necessary expenses . . . incurred by . . . a creditor in connection with the prosecution of a criminal
offense relating to the case or to the business or property of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.A. §503(b)(3)(C)
(Westlaw 2012).
41
Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 943 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
42
In re Summit Metals, Inc., 379 B.R. 40, 59 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (disallowing expenses
under §503(b)(3)(C) because the criminal case against the debtor’s principal did not relate to the
debtor’s case, property, or business).
43
The Bankruptcy Code contains provisions other than those discussed in this Article which
may have the effect of changing priorities of claims in a bankruptcy case, but which are not
particularly applicable to a Ponzi scheme case. For example, § 506(c) relates to a trustee’s ability to
surcharge a secured creditor’s collateral for the costs of preserving the creditor’s collateral; § 724(a)
permits a trustee to avoid tax and judgment liens that secure claims for noncompensatory tax
penalties and punitive damages; and §724(b) provides for subordination of certain types of
unavoidable tax liens to other types of claims, including administrative, wage and other priority
claims.
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treated and the priority of claims vis-à-vis one another. A few of the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that may have an impact in Ponzi
schemes are discussed below.
1.

Disallowing Claims Under Section 502(b)

Section 502(b) 44 sets forth six categories of claims that may be
disallowed as of the date of the filing of the petition. Although most of
these provisions may not have direct application in a Ponzi case, section
502(b)(2) may have the effect of leveling the playing field post-petition
for all categories of investors, irrespective of their promised interest rate
and irrespective of when they first invested in the fraudulent scheme.
Section 502(b)(2) suspends the accrual of interest on claims as of the
date of the filing of the petition. 45 It is applied uniformly to all
categories of investors in a Ponzi scheme. Some investors, referred to as
“net winners,” may have invested early in the scheme and been paid back
both the principal originally invested plus some of the promised fictitious
interest on top of the returned principal sum. Those net winner investors
may, however, still claim unpaid promised interest at the time of the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Other investors, referred to as “net
losers,” recovered something less than the full amount of their
investment in the scheme and continue to claim unpaid principal plus
unpaid interest at the time of the petition. An investor’s claim for
expected profits or “interest” will be cut off as of the petition date,
regardless of whether the investor is a net winner or net loser because
section 502(b) generally prohibits payment of post-petition interest on
pre-petition unsecured claims.

44

The six categories of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502 are summarized as follows:

(b)(1): such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or
unmatured;
(b)(2): such claim is for unmatured interest;
(b)(3): if such claim is for a tax assessed against property, such claim exceeds the value of
the interest of the estate in such property;
(b)(4): if such claim is for services of an insider or attorney of the debtor, such claim exceeds
the reasonable value of such services;
(b)(5): such claim is for a debt that is unmatured on the date of the filing of the petition and
that is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5) of this title; and
(b)(6): if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a
lease of real property.
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 502(b)(1)-(6) (Westlaw 2012).
45
Interest is “unmatured,” within the meaning of section 502(b)(2) if it was not yet due and
payable at the time the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. In re Thrifty Oil Co., 249 B.R. 537
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 322 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The rationale for suspending the accrual of interest as of the petition
date is based on the concept of equality of distribution. “[T]he rule
prevents any unmerited gain or loss by creditors whose claims have
different interest rates or who are paid at different times by the
bankruptcy court; all are treated equally.” 46 Although courts may
struggle with how to calculate the allowable amount of an investor’s
claim, as set forth in section II of this Article, the issue of whether to
permit a claim for post-petition interest is fixed by statute and is not
subject to debate.
There are, however, a few exceptions to this rule. First, in the rare
event that an estate is solvent, post-petition interest may be paid to
unsecured creditors pursuant to section 726(a)(5). 47 Second, an oversecured creditor may add post-petition interest to the amount of its claim
to the extent of the over-security. 48 Third, post-petition interest may be
allowed if a secured creditor holds collateral that yields interest,
dividends or other income, so that this income may be applied to the
payment of interest accruing on the debt after the date of the filing of the
petition. 49
2.

Disallowance of Claim of Transferee of Avoidable Transfer Under
Section 502(d)

Section 502(d) may also come into play in a Ponzi case to alter the
priorities of claims. That section states, “the court shall disallow any
claim of any entity . . . that is a transferee of a [voidable] transfer.” 50
This section may lead to the disallowance of investor claims in a Ponzi
case, and thereby alter the ultimate distribution to creditors. Trustees
commonly bring fraudulent transfer claims in Ponzi cases under section
548 or applicable state law to seek the return of fictitious profits paid to
investors, and sometimes to seek the return of principal repaid to
investors. 51 To the extent that such a voidable transfer has been made to
46

In re Fesco Plastics Corp, Inc., 996 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 U.S.C.A. § 726(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012).
48
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 370 (1988); Bondholder Comm. v. Williamson Cnty.
(In re Brentwood Outpatient, Ltd.), 43 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1994).
49
Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911); In re Jenson, 980 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1992)
(secured claim which included post-petition interest earned on funds held pursuant to prejudgment
writ of attachment represented allowable post-petition appreciation of the collateral rather than
unmatured interest).
50
11 U.S.C.A. § 502(d) (Westlaw 2012).
51
Courts generally find that the return of principal is not recoverable as a fraudulent transfer
because reasonably equivalent value is exchanged by the investor for the return of principal under a
restitution claim theory. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2008); but see
47
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an investor and is not returned, any claim filed by that transferee must be
disallowed under section 502(d). 52 In Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC), the court applied
section 502(d) to a SIPA claim as well because “a net equity claim is not
a claim against SIPC, but rather a claim against the pool of customer
property collected by the Trustee.” 53
A trustee may use section 502(d) in connection with avoidance
power rights under sections 547 (preferential transfers), 548 (fraudulent
transfers), 549 (unauthorized post-petition transfers), and 550 (recovery,
preservation and subsequent transferees), as well as when a trustee has
obtained a turnover order under section 542, or when a set off is
avoidable under section 543. In a Ponzi case, it is conceivable that a
trustee may bring claims under any of these Bankruptcy Code sections
seeking to recover property transferred by the Ponzi perpetrator either
pre- or post-petition, and the trustee may seek to disallow that claim the
extent that creditor fails to return the avoidable transfer to the estate.

3.

Changing Priorities by Subordination of Claims

The order of priority of claims can further be altered by
subordinating certain types of claims to others. Subordination alters the
otherwise applicable priority of that claim such that the subordinated
claim receives distribution only after the senior claims to which it has
been subordinated have been satisfied in full.
Section 510 provides for three types of subordination: (1) by
agreement (section 510(a)); (2) for claims arising out of certain securities
transactions (section 510(b)); and (3) equitable subordination (section
510(c)). 54
Equitable subordination under section 510(c) may occur in Ponzi
cases where one claimant has engaged in inequitable conduct that results
in injury to other creditors. “Equitable subordination allows the

Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 445 B.R. 206, 225 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Only innocent investors who reasonably believed that they were investing in a
legitimate enterprise are entitled to claims for restitution.”).
52
11 U.S.C.A. § 502(d) (Westlaw 2012).
53
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 445 B.R. at 239; see also Picard v. Madoff (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 458 B.R. 87, 120-21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
54
11 U.S.C.A. § 510 (Westlaw 2012).
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bankruptcy court to reprioritize a claim if it determines that the claimant
is guilty of misconduct that injures other creditors or confers an unfair
advantage on the claimant.” 55 Thus, claims can be reprioritized based on
the wrongful conduct of a claimant.
In determining the appropriateness of equitable subordination,
courts have nearly uniformly applied the standards established by the
Fifth Circuit in Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Corp.). 56 The
elements considered by courts in finding that a claim should be
subordinated are: “(i) [t]he claimant must have engaged in some type of
inequitable conduct[;] (ii) [t]he misconduct must have resulted in injury
to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the
claimant[;] (iii) [e]quitable subordination of the claim must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.” 57
A court may equitably subordinate a claim “notwithstanding the
apparent legal validity of a particular claim [where] the conduct of the
claimant in relation to other creditors is or was such that it would be
unjust or unfair to permit the claimant to share pro rata with the other
claimants of equal status.” 58 A recent bankruptcy fraud case illustrates
this principle. In Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Adelphia
Communications Corp. v. Bank of America (In re Adelphia
Communications Corp.), the court noted:
Inequitable conduct is that conduct which may be lawful, yet shocks
one’s good conscience. It means, inter alia, a secret or open fraud,
lack of faith or guardianship by a fiduciary; an unjust enrichment, not
enrichment by bon chance, astuteness or business acumen, but
enrichment through another’s loss brought about by one’s own
unconscionable, unjust, unfair, close or double dealing or foul
conduct. 59

In that case, the creditors’ committee alleged that the debtors’ banks
and investment bankers were sued for their conduct in allegedly assisting
the debtors in conducting a fraud to the disadvantage of other creditors.
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that there
were factual issues whether “the Defendants ‘knowingly or recklessly’

55

See In re Kriesler, 546 F.3d 863, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2008).
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Corp.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977)
(citation omitted); see also In re Kriesler, 546 F.3d at 865-66; Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper,
Inc. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).
57
In re Mobile Steel Corp., 563 F.2d at 700.
58
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am. (In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (footnote omitted).
59
Id. (citation omitted).
56
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assisted the Rigases in siphoning value out of the Debtors through the
Co-Borrowing Facilities, and ‘cemented their senior creditor status when
they knew that other creditors were providing capital on a junior basis
without having the same information about the Rigas Family’s
conduct.’” 60
Accordingly, in a Ponzi case where a claimant has engaged in
inequitable or fraudulent conduct, that creditor’s claim may be
subordinated. That consequence would be in addition to any direct
liability for fraud, aiding and abetting, or conspiracy that might be
imposed against that claimant for its wrongful conduct.
D.

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION SCHEME UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

After the priority and position of claims has been determined as set
forth above, a trustee must then follow the priorities for distribution of
property of the estate in a chapter 7 case, governed by section 726. 61
Section 726(a) deals with the general order of distribution in a chapter 7
liquidation case; section 726(b) deals with the distribution rules when
there is more than one claim within a particular class; and section 726(c)
deals with special distribution rules for individual debtors when the
estate includes community property.
In summary, after a trustee has paid valid, non-avoided liens on
property of the estate from the proceeds of the property, a trustee must
distribute cash on hand in the following manner:
(1) Section 726(a)(1): first, to timely filed claims specified in section
507 (priority claims and expenses). 62
(2) Section 726(a)(2): second, to timely filed allowed unsecured
claims.
(3) Section 726(a)(3): third, to tardily filed claims of claimants that
had notice or knowledge of the case in time for a timely filing. 63

60

Id. at 69.
11 U.S.C.A. § 726 (Westlaw 2012).
62
Section 726(b) provides that, if case has been converted, then claims entitled to priority
under § 507(a)(1) that are incurred in the chapter 7 case will have priority over claims entitled to
priority under § 507(a)(1) that were incurred while the case was pending under a different chapter.
11 U.S.C.A. § 726(b) (Westlaw 2012).
63
An exception exists for late filed priority claims, which will be treated as though timely
filed if filed before the trustee begins distribution. See, e.g., Cooper v. Internal Revenue, 167 F.3d
857 (4th Cir. 1999).
61
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(4) Section 726(a)(4): fourth, to claims for fines, penalties and
damages that do not compensate for actual pecuniary loss.
(5) Section 726(a)(5): fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate,
from the date of the filing of the petition, on any claim under sections
726(a)(1), (2), (3) or (4) above.
(6) Section 726(a)(6): sixth, in payment to debtor of any surplus.

Under these distribution rules, unless a claim has been granted
priority under section 507, all other types of timely filed allowed
unsecured claims, which would include both investor and non-investor
claims, will be paid at the same rate under section 726(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
Given the zero sum game of allowance and payment of creditors’
claims in Ponzi scheme cases, emotions run high in the final stages of
administering Ponzi insolvency proceedings. Because virtually no two
creditors are similarly situated, they are led to vie for priority over one
another. Trustees, receivers and courts presiding over these types of
proceedings strive to treat defrauded investors as equitably as possible.
General unsecured creditors in a receivership case may be left out in the
cold where investor claims may be given a higher priority, while the
Bankruptcy Code will require a trustee to treat defrauded investors and
general unsecured creditors similarly. As more of these types of cases
reach the courts, creditors of bankrupt Ponzi entities will likely continue
to push courts to apply equitable standards to fashion individualized
relief in a given case, whereas creditors in cases pending in district courts
under the administration of a receiver may find themselves challenging a
proposed distribution plan that seeks to place one category of victims
ahead of another.
Without any uniformity in the law or set standards for claims
allowance and distribution in Ponzi cases, claimants will be forced to
engage in battle after battle to assert their interests, with no clear winner
of the war on the horizon. One court suggested that perhaps the
treatment of claims in Ponzi cases is not a matter that should be left to
the discretion of individual judges. “Many of the arguments in favor of
avoidance of interest payments in a Ponzi-scheme situation rest upon
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seemingly arbitrary distinctions that ultimately represent policy
judgments . . . that is for Congress to do, not the courts.” 64

64

Lustig v. Weisz & Assocs., Inc. (In re Unified Commercial Capital), Nos. 01-MBK6004L, 01-MBK-6005L, 2002 WL 32500567, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).
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